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Private	firms	as	global	borrowers:	foreign	and
domestic	lenders	need	equal	protection
The	period	1990	to	2009	has	witnessed	private	firms	being	promoted	as	independent	borrowers	in	the	global	capital
market.	For	a	sample	of	85	emerging	market	economies,	in	terms	of	percentage	measures,	the	private	sector
publicly	non-guaranteed	share	of	total	external	debt	on	average	increased	from	less	than	5	per	cent	in	1990	to	about
17	per	cent	in	2009.	In	terms	of	debt	levels,	the	cross-country	average	stock	of	private	non-guaranteed	debt	per
capita	grew	from	$60	to	$663	(expressed	in	2010	dollars).	The	rise	of	a	decentralized	arrangement	for	international
debt	is	also	confirmed	by	recent	years’	data,	and	is	likely	to	continue	in	the	foreseeable	future.
However,	this	tendency	is	inconsistent	with	the	prediction	made	by	previous	studies	(Jeske,	2006),	i.e.,	a	centralized
setup,	where	only	governments	borrow	and	lend	internationally,	allows	higher	welfare	than	a	decentralized	setup.
The	reason	for	the	inconsistency	is	that	we	may	have	overlooked	the	role	played	by	creditor	rights	protection
institutions	—	a	key	determinant	of	how	much	lending	would	be	granted	to	private	debtors	(in	contrast,	the	effect	of
creditor	protection	on	sovereign	debts	are	less	significant	since	government	borrowers	are	the	ultimate	arbiter	of
public	contracts).	As	a	result,	instead	of	assuming	no	protection	for	foreign	creditors	and	perfect	protection	for
domestic	creditors	as	before,	the	current	research	shows	that	both	foreign	and	domestic	creditors	are	imperfectly
protected	and	there	exists	residence-based	discrimination	(Figure	1).
Figure	1.	Strength	of	foreign	vs.	domestic	creditor	rights	protection	institutions	in	emerging	market	countries,	2004-2009	–
average
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Note:	For	both	foreign	and	domestic	institutional	measures,	the	range	of	measure	is	normalized	to	0-10,	and	a	higher	score	means
stronger	institutions.	Foreign	and	domestic	creditors	are	treated	equitably	in	countries	located	near	the	45-degree	dashed	ray.
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Under	a	decentralized	borrowing	setup,	foreign	lenders	who	are	worried	about	potential	defaults	would	impose	credit
ceilings	on	domestic	borrowers.	In	addition,	given	imperfect	and	unequal	institutions,	it	is	obvious	that	foreign	lenders
would	raise	private	debt	ceilings	for	borrowers	residing	in	countries	with	stronger	foreign	creditor	protection,	but	the
relationship	between	debt	ceilings	and	the	strength	of	domestic	creditor	protection	remains	unclear.	If	this
relationship	is	negative,	then	centralization	may	decrease	the	amount	of	international	lending	and	reduce	the	welfare
of	debtor	countries.	This	is	because	the	resulting	perfection	of	the	domestic	creditor	rights	institution	can	be	overall
detrimental.	As	a	result,	to	support	the	growth	of	private	external	debt,	governments	of	emerging	markets	have	to
carefully	structure	the	pace	and	sequence	of	improvements	for	both	foreign	and	domestic	creditor	protection
institutions.
How	do	we	measure	the	strength	of	domestic	creditor	protection?
Since	difference	components	of	institutions	are	entangled	with	each	other,	it	is	a	challenging	task	to	find	valid
measures	for	any	single	set	of	institutions.	To	proxy	for	the	protection	of	domestic	creditors’	rights,	we	construct	five
alternative	measures	based	on	the	World	Bank’s	Doing	Business	(WBDB)	database.	This	database	gathers	data
from	questionnaire	responses	to	especially	designed	case	scenarios	involving	100	per	cent	domestic-owned	parties.
Our	primary	and	secondary	measures	are	taken	from	the	resolving	insolvency	scenario	(Djankov	et	al.,	2008):	the
“debt	recovery	costs”	spent	as	share	of	a	debtor’s	estate	value	and	the	“cents	on	the	dollar	recouped”	of	a	secured
bank	loan	in	insolvency	proceedings.	They	are	valid	proxies	given	that	insolvency	and	default	events	are	governed
by	similar	legal	schemes.
Our	next	two	measures	are	based	on	WBDB’s	enforcing	contracts	topic	(Djankov	et	al.,	2003):	the	“number	of
procedures”	to	enforce	a	plaintiff’s	claim	and	the	“enforcement	costs”	(calculated	as	share	of	the	value	of	the	claim)
to	complete	all	steps	in	a	commercial	dispute.	The	major	flaw	in	these	measures	is	that	they	are	more	informative
with	regard	to	protection	rights	affecting	commercial	transactions	rather	than	financing	activities.
The	last	measure	is	the	“strength	of	legal	rights”	index	from	the	getting	credit	scenario	(Djankov	et	al.,	2007).	This
index	captures	the	extent	to	which	rights	of	borrowers	and	lenders	are	protected	by	collateral	and	bankruptcy	laws.
Therefore,	it	is	about	the	existence	of	laws	that	matter	less	than	enforcement,	and	is	less	preferred.
The	protection	of	foreign	creditors’	rights	is	proxied	by	two	statistics	from	the	International	Country	Risk	Guide’s
Political	Risk	Rating	project.	The	primary	“investment	profile”	component	index	assesses	factors	affecting	the	risk	to
foreign	investment.	The	rating	assigned	is	the	sum	of	three	subcomponents:	contract	viability/expropriation,	profits
repatriation,	and	payment	delays.
Effects	of	domestic	creditor	rights	on	private	external	debt
After	unbundling	institutions	protecting	domestic	and	foreign	creditors’	rights.	We	estimate	a	negative	relation
between	the	degree	of	domestic	rights	protection	and	the	external	stock	of	private	non-guaranteed	debt	in	85
developing	countries	(Figure	2).
	Figure	2.	Average	stocks	of	private	and	public	debt	per	capita,	2004-2009
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Note:	private	sector	publicly	non-guaranteed	(PNG)	external	debt	comprises	long-term	external	obligations	of	private	debtors	that
are	not	guaranteed	for	repayment	by	a	public	entity.	Public	and	publicly	guaranteed	(PPG)	debt	comprises	long-term	external
obligations	of	public	debtors,	including	the	national	government,	political	subdivisions	(or	an	agency	of	either),	and	autonomous
public	bodies,	and	external	obligations	of	private	debtors	that	are	guaranteed	for	repayment	by	a	public	entity.	The	threshold	for
‘weak’	versus	‘strong’	domestic	or	foreign	creditor	rights	protection	is	set	at	the	median	for	its	primary	measure.
A	supply-side	explanation	is	that	strong	domestic	protection	supports	reliable	outside	financing	options	for	potential
external	debt	defaulters;	foreign	investors	anticipating	this	would	tighten	credit	constraints	ex	ante.	At	first	blush,	this
argument	could	apply	equally	to	public	borrowing.	We	assert,	however,	it	is	more	relevant	to	private	contracts.	For
one	thing,	the	legal	system	plays	a	lesser	role	in	public	debt	repayment.	For	another,	given	the	limited	liquidity	of
purely	domestic	funds,	a	large	portion	of	funds	available	to	individual	defaulters	is	intermediated	from	overseas	via
non-defaulted	agents.	Yet	if	the	government	defaults,	the	whole	country	is	excluded,	so	it	is	much	harder	to	mitigate
the	punishment	similarly.
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Another	explanation	relates	to	the	power	of	a	demand-side	story:	firms	might	be	unwilling	to	borrow	internationally
when	domestic	institutions	can	guarantee	an	ample	supply	of	local	credit	to	draw	on.	We	argue	this	substitution	effect
is	small	for	several	reasons.	First,	international	markets	often	come	to	complement,	rather	than	substitute	for,	the
domestic	capital	pool.	Second,	not	all	firms	have	access	to	foreign	funds,	but	for	those	who	succeeded	in	inducing
foreign	investments	or	had	the	skill	to	issue	bonds	abroad,	external	debt	is	preferred	because	of	limited	monitoring
and	lower	capital	costs.	Third,	there	is	extensive	evidence	suggesting	that	creditors	determine	the	terms	of	contracts
and	debtors	are	constrained.
To	get	a	sense	of	the	magnitude	of	the	adverse	relation,	consider	two	countries	with	foreign	creditor	rights	rankings
below	the	lower	quartile.	If	we	move	up	from	around	25th	percentile	(Nigeria)	to	around	75th	percentile	(Iran)	in	the
distribution	of	domestic	creditor	rights,	we	have	$170	less	debt	per	capita	during	the	sample	period	of	2004-2009	on
average.	It	represents	a	35	per	cent	decrease	in	the	sample	mean,	which	is	$487.	With	a	parallel	pair	of	countries
(Cameroon	and	Greece)	that	fall	above	the	upper	quartile	in	foreign	creditor	rights	rankings,	this	negative	effect	turns
positive	($937	more	debt	per	capita	as	we	move	up	from	25th	to	75th	percentile	in	domestic	rights).	It	is	because	the
supply-side	story	barely	operates	when	foreign	investments	are	fully	guarded	by	quality	protection	of	foreign
creditors’	rights.	Stronger	domestic	protection	now	indicates	better	governance	and	creditworthiness.	These	findings
are	robust	to	different	measures	of	creditor	rights,	to	controlling	for	a	host	of	non-legal	determinants,	and	to	a	multiple
instrumental	variables	strategy.
Policy	implications
Hypothetically,	if	we	can	sort	out	the	complex	and	contingent	relations	of	a	bundle	of	institutions,	it	is	intuitive	that	the
bundle’s	domestic	side	supports	home	market,	and	its	foreign	side	boosts	external	intermediation.	A	negative
relationship	between	the	domestic	arm	of	creditor	rights	protection	and	external	private	debt	suggests	that,	to	attain
efficient	borrowing,	domestic	rights	institution	building	should	be	combined	with	eliminating	foreign	discrimination;
otherwise,	there	is	an	incentive	for	private	sector	to	default	internationally	first,	causing	foreign	creditors	to	tighten
constraints.	This	policy	implication	is	evident	in	the	international	round	tripping	in	relation	to	financial	transactions	in
Africa,	India	and	China.	It	also	underpins	the	“revived	Bretton	Woods”	interpretation	of	the	capital	flow	structure	vis-a-
vis	emerging	Asia	(Dooley	et	al.,	2004).
♣♣♣
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